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The objective of this paper is to identify and discuss the .Principal industrial relations 
issues that have emerged in ,the first year of operation of s,everal of the new state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). The paper does not cover all the SOEs, nor does it pretend to analyse 
all the industrial relations issues of the first year of their operation. It is based on research 
and inte.rviews conducted with unions and management in 6 of the SOEs - Electricorp, 
For.estrycorp, Airwayscorp, NZ Post, Telecom and Postbank. Its focus is nat on a detailed 
analysis of the agreements negotiated in the new corporations, but ~ather upon the natzue 
of the relationships that hav.e e.merged there. The SOEs were established as a .Policy 
decision to shift state trading enterprises away from the public service orientation inherent 
in their status as departments of state to a new e.mphasis upon commercial criteria. The 
issue I wish .to address in .this paper is the extent .to which the character of industrial 
relations in .the SOEs has reflected this shift in orientation. 
Issues of pow~er and control have been the chief considerations in the industrial 
relations of the SOEs so far . This is not surprising. The setting up of the SOEs broke 
with organisational structures and accompanying industrial felations and personnel 
arrangements that had developed over at least 75 years. Trade unions and management had 
adjusted structurally and operationally to those arrangements and their relations with each 
other had been moulded within them. Their r~elations were of a continuing nature in which 
present outcomes were shaped by past practices. Union and management organisation, 
membership and management attitudes and actions, political and ~economic considerations, 
statutory pfescription and tribunal interpretation had foirued a configuration from which 
came a particular balance of industrial forces. This varied across time, sector and issues. 
Corporatisation altefed that configuration. It chang~ed the nature of its components and it 
weighted them differently. This was not a neutral intervention. By replacing past practices 
with radically new ones, the Government disrupted the existing balance of forces and 
opened the door to a struggle for power and control in the new corporations. This paper is 
an initial effort to chart the frrst year of that struggle. 
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Th~e background to corporatisation 
One would nonnally expect the early period of new types of organisations like the 
SOEs to be marked by a struggle for control between unions and manag~ement. This 
expectation is enhanced when one considers the policy objectives of corporatisation and 
the circumstances in which the SOEs were established. Corporatisation is an early and 
striking example of the Government's wjder programme of state restructuring which has . 
becom~e a key aspect of its economic policy and whose pace has quickened remarkably 
since 1985. It is not an exaggeration to say that the role of the state has become the 
~central political question in New Zealand. In the frrst half of 1988 alone, the State Sector 
Act, the Gibbs and Picot ~eports, the Royal Commission on Social Policy and major 
reviews of several Government departments have an spoken to different dim~ensions of 
this. In this context, corporatisation was important because it established a particular way 
of thinking about the appropriate role of the state . Since then, the principles which 
underpinned this hav~e bid fair to become the new orthodoxy in social and economic 
policy. 
At the heart of the corporatisation model of the state is a set of arguments about the 
allocation, deployment and assessment of resour~ces, including human resources, that hav~e 
significant relevance for industrial relations. The economic justification for corporatisation 
centered on the claimed inefficiencies of state trading enterprises as they wer~e constituted 
prior to 1987. The full arguments in support of this position are well-known (TJieasury, 
1984; Gregory, 1987). Both the diagnosis and the recommended solution implied major 
industrial relations change. This stemmed immediately from 'the statutory requirement that 
the SOEs be run as successful businesses in which commercia). criteria w~ere to • 
predominate in all decisions. Managerial autonomy and accountability wer~e elevated to the • 
forefront and managerial perfounance was to be measured against the yardstick of • 
maximum efficiency in the allocation of resources. Behind this lay the argument that 
efficiency had been impeded in the past by restrictive practices, either imposed by unions 
or agreed to by weak management, and by a burdensome set of personnel and wage-fixing 
rules which inhibited managerial performance. To this end the personnel and industrial 
· relations arrangements of the state sector were no longer legislatively mandated for the 
new corporations. 'Thus., corporatisation had as one important policy agenda the reassertion 
of managerial control in the workplace. 
The circumstances in which the corporatisation policy was developed also made it 
mo~e likely that ~control would be a central issue in the SOEs. There were three elements 
to this. One was the dominant role by Treasury in promoting corporatisation over the 
opposition of the State Services Commission (Gregory, 1987, p.ll3). 'The second was the 
exclusion of the state unions from influential involvement in the process. The third was 
the appointn1ent to the Establishment Boards of private sector employers, many of them 
members of the Business Roundtable. Together, these three factors clarified the character 
of the coalition pushing for corporatisation and the links between it and wider economic 
policy concerns. In particular, it clarified corporatisation's c.onnection with ideas of labour 
market deregulation in both the private and state sectors. An important aspect of that 
agenda is a denial of the legitimacy of trade unions and a determination to restofe the 
primacy of management in the workplace. Promotion of that agenda necessarily poses the 
issue of control. 
Manage·ment strategies 
• 
• 
The .analys.is in this paper is premised on the view that managerial rather than union 
initiatives provide the key to industrial relations in 'the first year of the SOEs. This does • 
not derive from a belief in union weakness but from an assessment of the structural and 
political circumstances surrounding the establishment of the corporations. They are new 
• 
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organisations set up to fealise specific policy objectives to do with managerial efficiency • 
and performance. New organisational and management structur~es were introduced, 
significant chang~es were made in operational practices within the corporations, and in 
many cases new personnel were appointed. Established industrial relations procedur~es were 
discarded in favour of a new regime based on markedly dif~erent rules and procedures. 
Moreover, unlike the State Sector Act, the SOE Act did not carry over any conditions of • 
employment; all had to be negotiated afresh under radically different circumstances. 
Similarly, political factors handed the advantage to management. The members of the 
corporation boanls and senior management, especially chief ~ex~ecutives, were appointed in 
~circumstances which raised expectations with regard to managerial initiatives. They were a 
new blieed of private sector managers brought in to remedy the inefficiencies of the past 
and to make the SOEs viable, ~even profitable commeficial enterprises. Their reputations 
and that of the Government were thought to be at least partly dependent on their • 
implementation of innovative and commercially successful policies. The impetus for 
change cam,e from the management side of the fence; it is therefore to be expected that 
manag~ement initiatives will establish the framework ~or industrial relations in the first 
year of operation. 
Nonetheless, despite the broadly similar forces at work, there has been considerable 
variation in the industrial relations strategies adopted by management in the six SOEs in 
this study. At a g,eneral level, and mindful of the risk of over-simplification, it appears 
that they fall into 3 categories. All 6 have sought to assert managerial control. The 
variation stems from the degree to which the con'trol strategies they have chosen peuuit 
the development of good working relations with the trade unions which represent their 
employees. Forestrycorp and Electricorp hav~e chosen strategies which have made it 
exceedingly difficult to dev~elop satisfactory relations with their unions. Strategies 
followed by Postbank and Airways have had mixed implications for relations with unions, 
both jeopardising and encouraging them. In contrast, NZ Post and Telecom appear to have 
given higher priority than the other four to the development of good union relations. This 
categorisation is not immutable. ~On particular issues, the corporations may not fall into 
this hieruchy, whilst over time, a corporation may shift strategies and become more or 
less antagonistic towards trade unions. At present, there is some evidence suggesting that 
Telecom is adopting a mme adversarial stance towards the Post Office Union than was the 
case over the first 12 months. 
Thus, it is apparent that accounting ~or the industrial relations differences among the 
new corporations may be as important and as interesting a task as pointing to the broad 
patterns established in the first year of their operation. The 6 were established at the same 
time, for the same reasons, and as part of the same overall policy. And yet, divergent 
industrial relations practices became visible within the frrst year. Why? At this stage, it is 
possible only to begin to sketch what a full answer to this question might look like. 
Much of the answer is not acc,essible and has to do with internal policy decisions at the 
highest level of the organisations. Time will permit more considered and infot 1ned 
judgements than those attempted here., but the contemporary relevance is such that the 
issue can not be put to one side. 
Electricorp and Forestrycorp appear to have had the clearest understanding of industrial 
relations as an .integral component of their corporate strategy. In each case, a policy 
decision was taken to establish an industrial relations regim~e designed to maximise 
efficiency and thus profitability. This may be related to to the particular attitudes towards 
the role of trade unions held by Board members and senior management. In Electricorp's 
case, the new industrial relations approach became plainly visible after it was res~ctured. 
It may be expected that the current r~estructuring in Telecom may produc,e similar 
outcomes, especially if a decision is made to follow the Electricorp line of independent 
competitive business units. · 
Past relations with unions have been important. NZ Post, Telecom and Postbank have 
profited from the historically good relations between the Post Office and the Post ,Office 
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Union. However, pfesent relations are at least partially dependent on how past relations are 
interpreted. Postbank appeared to view the joint consultation which occurred in the Post 
Office as spilling ov~er into joint management and was det~et 1nined not to start down that 
path. It is notable that its relations with the .POU have been more adversarial than those of 
the other two. As one example, it alone of the 3 rejected a union suggestion of joint 
working parties prior to negotiations to clarify positions and assist in reaching a 
settlement. 
Union organisation and strength have materially influenced management strategi~es. In 
the Post ~Office, industTial strength lay with workers now with either Telecom or NZ Post, 
but not with bank employees. Similarly, Fofestrycorp have sought to tak~e advantage of 
the relative industrial weakness of their ~employees.  Con¥ersely, as in Electricorp, 
industrial strength can also provide incentives for a control-oriented management to adopt • 
a rigorously uncompromising stance in an ef£ort to reverse the balance of forces. The 
degree of competition faced by an SOE has had an impact on its industrial relations 
policies. Forestrycorp faces direct and visible competition from other forestry companies 
and it is clear that this has strongly influenced its employee strategy. Postbank faces direct 
competitors, unlike NZ Post and Telecom, although the latter is alert to the implications 
of de-regulation and the possibility of future competition. 
Negotiations in the S ~OEs 
Most SOEs hav~e now completed two rounds of negotiations. The frrst usuaUy resulted 
in a transitional determination promulgated under the State Services Conditions of 
Employment Act which took effect from April 1 1987. For the most part, the transitional 
deteuninations carried over existing conditions of employment. The main departures from 
the status quo were in the areas of union coverage and personnel procedures, bolh of which 
wiH be discussed below. Forestrycorp stood out in those negotiations. It adopted a 
characteristically control-oriented approach from the start. Forestrycorp was unusual 
among the SOEs in that it dealt with 3 unions. It concluded an agree.ment with the 
'Timberworkers union based on longstanding relativity with the agreements in the other 
main forestry companies. It was unable to settle a transitional dete1 .rnination with ·the NZ 
Workers union or the PSA. Forestrycorp believed that a number of state conditions of 
employmen~ including union coverage, were incompatible with its need to compete with 
its private sector rivals. Forestrycorp unilaterally issued a transitional determination to 
cover Workers union members on March 31 1987, and offered individual contracts of 
employment to PSA members. It took until May 1988 to conclude an agreement with the 
Workers union; the PSA agreement is still outstanding. 
Other SOEs also had difficulty in settling their first actual agreement following their 
transitional detennination. These agreements were negotiated under the tenns of the 
Labour Relations Act. Of the SOEs in this study, Airways and Electricorp had the most 
problems. In neither case did wages constitute the difficulty. Indeed, the ~emphasis upon 
issues r·elated to power and control meant that wag~es and salari~es were not contentious 
issues in the SOEs. The major difficulty in the wages area was the refusal of Airways to 
backdate its wage increase, a position upheld in mediation. The need to recruit and retain 
good staff predominated in wage negotiations, and aU the SOEs followed the trend set in 
t11e private sector. There had been some discussion prior to Lhc wage round that an SOE 
might become a trend-seu~er, but this did not eventuate. The only departur~c from the going 
rate was the 8.2 percent in Electricorp, which part1y followed the higher ~electricians' 
settlement in the private sector, but much more importantly was a trade-off for the PSA's 
acceptance of 7 separate agreements to cover Elcctricorp's 7 new business units . I shall 
return to the Electricorp settlement below. There is increasing use throughout the SOEs of 
performance-based salary scales such as Hay or Price Waterhouse . In future union 
advocates may find themselves negotiating over locations on such a scale. These may pose 
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a potential problem for unions in that many union members see them as objective and 
support their use, whereas unions prefer a collective-based bargaining system. 
There has been little substantial ~change in fotnaally prescribed national conditions of 
employment. The chief impetus for change has come from management reluctance to 
include particular local or administrative conditions in the national agreements. This has 
been an important issue in the curr~ent negotiations ~o consolidate the 7 Electricorp 
documents. One area where there has been change is equal employment opportunity, and 
that is examined separately below. Other than Forestrycorp, Airways was the only 
corporation to mount an attack on specific ~employment conditions. Their campaign to 
alter the basis of shift fOSters resulted in the ~corporation gaining the right to implement 
new procedures if it ~chooses to do so, a result consistent with the new stress on 
managerial discretion. In this context, day-to-day conditions of employment have 
undergone change, as management has sought to establish unquestioned control at the • 
workplace itself. 
Union cove:rage 
Struggles over power and control in New Zealand industrial relations have not usually 
involved the ·issue of union coverage. One reason is that management has had little 
structural opportunity to involve itself in the matter. Indeed, it has historically been a 
matter resolv~ed not by the parties themselves but by others. In the state sector, union 
coverage has been settled politically, by means of Ministerial recognition, while in the 
privat~e sector the legislatively-prescribed registration process has settled the issue 
administrativ~ely .. Such disputes as there have been over union ~coverage hav,e tended to be 
inter-union demarcation disputes rather than union/management conflicts. The nature of 
the industrial relations system, which had at its centlie the resolution of disputes by 
representativ~e organisations of unions and employers, also discouraged employers from 
questioning the system of union coverage, as did the pragmatic acceptance by most 
employers of the necessary role played by unions. 
The setting up of the SOEs of£ered an opportunity to break with that pattern. Unlike 
most management in taking over an existing entel])rise or establishing a new one, the 
management of the SOBs did not inherit an established system of union coverage. It was 
an unsettled issue, both in terms of which unions, if any, would have coverage, and the 
level at which coverage would apply. 
Policy objectives converged with structural opportunity. Many of those appointed to 
senior management and the Establishment Boards shared the view that the historically 
poor performance of state trading enterprises was attributable to weak management and 
strong unions. They were detennined to reverse this. Added to this was the articulation of 
a new manag~erial antagonism to the very principle of trade unionism, which found 
expression among some of the SOE appointees. This fepresented a significant departure 
from traditional managerial ideology in New Zealand, and can be traced partly to the 
increasingly important role in industrial relations played by chief executives and the loss 
of predominance by the more pragmatic industrial relations professionals. This itself 
derives from a variety of causes related to the restructuring of the economy. 
There was some S~OE r~esistance to the principle of union coverage and delayed 
Ministerial recognition of the PSA in Electricorp, the first to settle the union coverage 
principle. In practice, the focus shifted to the level of cov~erage. All SOEs tried to 
minimise the scope of union coverage, thus ~enhancing managerial control. In general, 
most began from a position of wanting to confine coverage to positions with salaries 
below the coverage level in the Clerical Workers' award. This was entirely unacceptable to 
the unions as it 'Would hav~e deprived them of a significant proportion of their 
membership . In 'the case of Postbank, for instance, the loss would have been about 30 
percent. The issue was settled by specifying a set of senior managerial positions exempt 
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from union coverage. The coverage loss has not been great. It is less than 3 percent in the 
three corporations covered by the Post Office Union; while for those covered by the PSA, 
the loss appears to have varied between 5 and 15 percent. The stfongest resistance to 
retention of high levels of union coverage was in Forestrycorp, where PSA coverage 
remains very low, and in Electricorp. All the SOEs place great emphasis upon direct 
communication with their e·mployees over the heads of the unions, in an eftort to shift 
workers' loyalty away from the union to the corporation. • 
The Iiesolution of the union coverage issue should not be regarded as final. In many of 
the SOEs, management is unhappy at the outcome so far, and views the current position 
as negotiable in the future renewal of agfeements. The main management thrust so far has 
been on personnel matters, to which we shall turn in a moment. To some degree, 
management success there, which was considerable, was trnded off against union coverage. 
But ·there can be no doubt that in some SOEs, unions will soon be faced with balancing 
particular conditions of employment against union cov·erage levels. The union coverage 
status quo is better than in the private sector. Management in the SOEs place great store 
by equivalence with the private sector, and this, combined with the ideological and policy 
reasons mentioned above should ensure that union coverage remains a central industrial 
relations issue in the corporations. 
Managerial prerogatives 
There has been a consistent and uniform drive by SOE management to restore 
managerial discretion in all areas. The personnel procedures in the State Services Act 1962 
became a key target in all SOEs. Existing statutory provisions with regard to merit 
appoinUnents, appeals, promotions, transfers, classification, grading and tennination wer·e , 
eliminated and replaced by provisions giving management vastly increased discretion. The 
statutory requirement to be a good employer in section 4 of the SOE Act did not pr~event 
this. Sweeping away the state services personnel procedures (now removed there too) was 
seen as essential both to managerial authority and to being a com.mercially profitable 
enterprise. There appears to have been no significant union resistance to this. These are 
difficult issues on \vhich to mobilise members, especially given the general strategic 
weakness of the unions. The personnel provisions of the State Services Act were an 
integral part of the suucture of a non-political career service. The removal of the SOEs 
from this context robbed unions of much of the justification for their retention. 
The personnel provisions of the State Services Act should be seen as equal opportunity 
measures, as was made plain in the debate over the State Sector Act in 1988. Their 
elimination has significant implications for the redr~ess of employment inequality. 
Although the SOEs' statutory requirement to be a good employer includes the 
implementation of an equal opportunity programme, the corporations have not so far been 
notable for including progressive EEO policies in their induslrial agreements. The overall 
picture is complex, but some issues are clear. Most of the SOEs have reduced maternity 
leave conditions to the provisions of the Pa.fental Leave and Employment Protection Act 
1987 which are inferior in important fespects to those in the public service; theJie is little 
if any commitment to support for setting up child-care centres for SOE staff; sick leave 
and domestic leave condi Lions are worse in some cases; and, there is little evidence of 
carrying over either the Maori and Pacific Islander recruitment programmes or the equality 
n1anag·ement programmes. Other EEO provisions such as pcrn1anent part-time work, 
flexible working hours and ber~eavernent leave (including tangihangi leave) ar~e often 
worded in such a way as to give manag~ement much greater discretion in their 
implementation. Equal employment opportunity measures are seen as limiting Lhe 
capacity of management lO tum the SOBs into con1mercial profit centr~es. 'They too have 
been a casualty of the managerial drive for the reassertion of control. 
• 
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Once again, it is difficult for unions to mobilise their ·members on these issues and it 
is ~evident that existing EEO provisions are lik·ely to be targeted by the SOEs in the next 
round of negotiations. Already, influential commentators are preparing the ideological 
ground for such an attack (Jennings and Cameron, 1987, p.151). The policy implications 
are that under the present balance of industrial forces, ·equal opportunity measures requir~e 
both statutory protection in the for.m of specific entitlements and enforcement 
mechanisms. Both are lacking in the SOEs. It remains to be seen whether the situation 
w.ill develop diffierently in the state services under the State Sector Act, where the 
enforcement role of the State Services Commission is considerable. 
Consultation was an important area where the issue of .managerial pre~ogativ~e was 
posed sharply. The changes in this area appear to be most visible in Electricorp and in the 
three corporations that have emerged from the Post Office. As government departments, 
these organisations had a centralised, highly consultativ·e and cooperative decision-making 
process in which the unions enjoyed considerable influence. In the SOEs, management has 
tried to diminish union influence over decisions by moving decisively away from a 
genuinely consultatiV:e approach, although, as we shall see, the~e is some variation in the 
degree to which this has happened. 
In Electricorp, this rejection of consultation was expressed in a bitter conflict over job 
losses. In September 1987, Electricorp had completed its restructuring process which had 
fallen behind schedule. It decided that it needed to shed 800 positions, which itself breached 
its earlier agreement with the PS A that there would be no substantial job losses. On its 
own admission, Electricorp was deteuuined not to enter negotiations with the PSA on the 
issue, and only grudgingly was it prepared to peunit its local managers to engage in a very 
restricted ~orm of consultation with the PSA. This led directly to notice of industrial 
action. Electricorp then secured an ex parte injunction against the PSA, which curtailed 
the planned action. The injunction was based on Electricorp's claim that the PSA's advice 
on its proposals to minimise the impact of the action in fact constituted a breach of the 
notice of action. In turn, the PSA obtained its own injunction against Electricorp binding 
it to the tet1ns of their agreement. Neither .injunction went to a full hearing, and the issue 
was disposed of by an administrative agreement 
The significance of the dispute was two-fold. At one level, it concerned Electricorp's 
decentralisation of authority to local managers and the PSA's reaction to that. We shall 
return to this below. At another level, its significance lay in the importance Electricorp 
attached to not negotiating with the PSA over job losses and in being seen not to 
negotiate. Eleclricorp regarded the dispute as an opportunity to establish that its 
management policies would differ substantially from those of its predecessor, the New 
Zealand Electricity Department (NZED). 'This was made plain by the manner in which it 
took the injunction against the pfoposed industrial action. In the past, industrial action by 
electricity staff had normally been directed against the Government (as in the derecognition 
disputes of 1979 and 1983) or the State Services Commision rather than against NZED 
itself. This reflected the centralisation of industrial r~elations under the previous regime and 
the limited role played by the department. In those circumstances the PSA and NZED had 
cooperated to minimise the impact of the action. This had involved staff staying on the 
job and being paid while limiting production but not distribution and thus not affecting 
the consumer. In this case, Electricorp, as the target of the action., decided it would not 
cooperate as its predecessor had done, and that it would exploit the offer of cooperation to 
secure the injunction. M:oreov~er, it decided to Jiefuse to pay workers during the limited 
action that did take place, while gambling that they would not walk off the job. 
Whatever ethical reservations individual Electricorp managers may hav~e had about 
these strategies- and there is some suggestion that not all were entirely happy with them-
they were seen as crucial to distingush Electricorp management polices from. those of its 
predecessor. Eleclricorp management believes that its conduct of the dispute showed its 
own managers, its Board, its ~employees and the PSA that it was deteunined to control the 
operation of the ~corporation. It was important for Electricorp that this be done early and 
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with conviction. In that sense, the dispute served important managerial purposes and 
clarified Electricorp's expectations about power relations in the corporation. The other side 
of the dispute is the impact it had on employee r~elations and the manner in which it 
embittered those difectly involved from the electricity group and from the staff of the 
PSA. This may have significant long-teun consequences, but these were not important 
policy concerns for Electricorp at the time. 
The shift away from consultative manag~ement has been apparent in Postbank, 
Telecom and NZ Post also. The Post ~Office operated with an ·elaborate network of joint 
union/management consultative arrangements. Indeed to outsiders, the Post Office 
appeared to constitute a r·emarkable example of power-sharing. One obvious spin-off of 
this was the industrial harmony that prevailed there. However, under corporatisation., these 
arrangements were viewed as a major contributor to the claimed inefficiencies of the Post 
Office and as a reason for corporatisation. They soon became a natural target for the new 
management and have in fact been eliminated in all 3 ~corporations. However, as noted 
earlier, the 3 vary considerably in the extent to which they continue the practice of 
cooperation depending on their interpretation of the meaning of the joint consultation 
procedures of the past 
Decentralisation of managerial authority 
A key developm~ent in all the SOEs has been the decentralisation of managerial 
authority. (There is some suggestion that Airways Corporation is in the process of re-
centralising authority, but if so this process is only in the very early stages.) Before 
corporatisation, decision-making, including industrial relations and personnel matters, was 
highly centralised. Decentralisation poses a challenge to both union and management . 
structures. For management, the challenge in many SOEs has been to develop its own · 
industrial relations management. In the past, the now-corporatised gov~ernment 
deparunents were able to downgrade the importance of industrial and personnel skills, 
since the SSC made the major, and even tbe minor decisions in these aJieas. This is no 
longer the case. The need to bring in new management, including some from the private 
sector unaware of past practices and, if made aware, unsympathetic to those that varied 
from the private sector, has hastened the process of change, especially in terms of 
establishing a private sector-oriented model of management control. It is significant that 
this process of change has been least dramatic in the 3 corporations drawn from the Post 
Office, which had a well-developed industrial relations management structure. 
The other challenge posed for management by the decentralisation of authority was to 
chang~e the attitudes of regional and local management who were accustomed to exercising 
little autonomy and to referring issues back to the centre . 'This clashed with the ~emphasis 
upon decentralised, accountable, perfotntance-oriented ·manag~ement. In the Post ~Office, 
management had also been able to take refuge in the processes of joint consultation and to 
avoid making decisions in ~cases whelie the union's view had not been established. This 
has raised the question of how successfully and responsibly local management are 
ex~ercising their new authority. Inevitably, the pictufe is mixed and the evidence so far is 
anecdotal only. Some union officials suggest that there has been a marked increase in 
dismissals and other disciplinary measures, but the evidence is not conclusive. Other 
union officials have remarked, with some sympathy, upon the great pressures placed upon 
local management under the new policies and the stress generated for them by the 
relentless emphasis upon performance. On the other hand, SOE management appeared 
aware of the tu1 n1oil that corporatisation had involv~ed for middle management at the local 
level and concerned to minimise its impact 
For unions, the challenge posed by the decentralisation of managerial authority has 
been significant. Their structures had dev~eloped historically to meet corresponding 
management structures and the location of management decisions. At the same time these 
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structures shaped and were shaped by the fact that union/management bargaining generated 
nationally uniform outcomes. Accordingly, state unions had developed quite differently 
from their private sector counterparts. Above all they were national in structure and 
centralised in operation. The sudden management shift away from this and perhaps also 
from national conditions of employment demanded an organisational response of the 
• UDIOOS. 
The decentralisation process has gone furthest in Electricorp, which has restructured 
itself into 7 autono.mous business units. Electricorp regarded the securing of 7 separate 
agreements to cover the business units as vital to its r~estructuring process. To secure the 7 
agreemen'ls, Electricorp was ·willing to carry over existing conditions of employment from 
the transitional deteunination, to offer an above-average wage settlement and to take 
industrial action from the PSA without seeking any restraining injunctions. One reason 
for the lack of injunctions was that in response to the earlier injunction the PSA has now 
become scrupulously legalistic in its notices of industrial action. The other was that in 
this case, unJiJc,e the dispute over job losses, a mutually satisfactory settlement was one of 
Electricorp'•s objectiv,es. 
For the PSA and the electricity group in particular, devolution and fragmentation 
appeaiied to threaten the basis of their power which had always operated at a national level 
and in tetn1s of the electricity group as a whole. In practice, the impact would depend upon 
the strategic resources of workers in the different units, and it is difficult to predict this 
with confidence, although it does appear that in some units resources would be limited. 
Clearly, the existence of 7 agreements raises the possibility of diffe~ent conditions of 
employment in the 7 units. In all SOEs, as in the state services since the State Secoor 
Act, there is theoretical potential ~or departure from national ~conditions of employment 
within the same organisation. 
Unions have begun the organisational changes needed to adapt to these structural 
changes in management decision-making. The Post Office Union, which was previously 
highly centralised in its operations, has had to shitt staff .resources from its central office 
out to the regions to cope with the new decision-making patterns. The PSA has always 
placed more emphasis upon its regional structure, at least in te1ms of its full-time 
officials, whilst giving rather less of a role to local and regional elected officials, reflected 
in the anachronism of a (soon to be abolished) ,entir~ely Wellington-based Executive 
Committee. The PSA is undergoing a major organisational review at present, and 
corporatisation has been an additional factor, although a significant one, to be considered 
in that process. For all unions caught up in corporatisation, the decentralisation of 
managerial authority has reinfoJiCed the importance of developing an infottned and trained 
delegate structure, effective communication structures and internally democratic procedures 
which ensure responsiveness to members' needs. The new management structures put an 
end to any notions that the national union office is best placed to know about important 
developments and to articulate the policies most appropriate to deal with them. The 
possibility of varying conditions and policies being followed in different regions and 
organisational units means that traditional assumptions about national unifotanity have to 
be ' I 
The trade union r~esponse to the new environment introduced by corporatisation has 
been subject to frequent criticism. Much of this criticism ~comes from opposing vested 
interests and can be appropriately discou1uvd. ~Other arguments warrant more serious 
consideration. These centre on whether the unions responded to corporatisation in 'Ways 
that best protected the interests of their members. Some members were ~eager to break out 
of what they saw as th~e confines of the state system and w,ere confident they would do 
well out of the new system. These members saw the unions as opposing new 
opportunities for them. Others with more modest ambitions sometimes clai~ed that the 
unions were more concerned with ~e problems of those without jobs at the expense of 
getting the best conditions for those still in jobs. Conversely, others whose jobs were lost 
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or threatened did not see the unions as providing very practical assistance to them or as 
effectively mobilising resources to pfotect their jobs. 
It is not possible easily to evaluate the validity of these arguments. For ~every anecdote 
of union inadequacy, another of union success can be offered. However, there are structural 
and contextual reasons why unions would have difficulty adapting to corporatisation. As 
the examples above show, corporatisation divides union members and generates 
conflicting demands on unions. Corporatisation does this to management too. But it is 
~easier to change management structures and practices than to do the same in a union. It is 
not a simple conttast of democratic versus hierarchical models. Rather, it has to do with 
the contrasting character of unions and companies as organisations, especially in their 
authority relations, incentive structures and decision-making processes. 
Management personnel have career ambitions that ar~e fostered by achieving the policy 
objectives prescribed for them by senior management who retain powerful sanctions for 
breaches. In unions, objectives we not so much prescribed as evolved from what may be a 
lengthy process in which the opportunities for delay, diversion, sabotage or plain non-
decision are endless. Members, or more accurately activists, are in a .much less subordinate 
position than their counterparts in companies. They may resist official objectives once 
decided and agitate for change. There is no readily available means of disciplining them for 
this since resistance is tolerated in principle if not welcomed in practice, and there are few 
sanctions available to senior union personnel with which to compel activist compliance 
since neither their jobs nor their future careers depend on union personnel. Thus in a 
process of radical change such as corporatisation, management is strategically better placed 
than unions to set objectives quickly and compel their achievement. This is especially so 
when, as with corporntisation, it is a management-initiated process of change from which 
unions were largely ·excluded and which cut across membership solidarity. 
Conclusions 
Corporatisation proceeded at a rem.arkable pace. It took only 16 months from the frrst 
policy statement in December 1985 to the operation of the new corporations in April 
1987. Restructuring by the corporations since then has maintained the relentless impetus 
for change. The impact upon individuals and communities has been dramatic . At an 
organisational level, unions and the SOEs have had to shape a new relationship under 
vastly altered circumstances from those that prevailed before. This process is very much in 
its infancy. The ~crucial issue in this period has been the struggle for power and control. 
The SOEs have enjoyed structural and contextual advantages and have made significant 
advances. The capacity of the unions to reverse those advances depends on the balance of 
economic and political forces, not least of which is privatisation. There is little in t.hc 
broad context that gives reason to expect a reversal of present trends in the industrial 
relations of the SOEs. Thus any significant recovery by unions is likely to depend on 
organisational factors, especially industrial strength, cohesion, solidarity and leadership. 
These qualities are not evenly distributed and they are not easily brought to bear on all 
issues. Therefore, there is Hkely to be an uneven pattern of development in the medium-
tenn future; the days of unifonnity appear to be finished. 
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